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AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A MODEL
OXYMORON, OR WHO KNEW THE
CONSTITUTION ENSHRINED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR STATES?
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS lliE AMERICAN CONsnruDON!
By Robert A. Dahl. 1 New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
2001. Pp. 208. Hardcover, $19.95
Miranda Oshige McGowan 2
"How democratic is the American constitution?" Dahl asks.
Well, in 2000, for the fourth time in our history, the presidential
candidate with the most votes lost. And for the second time in
our history, the Supreme Court-the deliberately nondemocratic branch of our government-decided the election.3
Within six months after the election, few seemed terribly bothered by the election's outcome. Indeed, only a tiny majority of
Americans said in 2001 that they wanted to replace the Electoral
College with direct, popular election of the president4 -down
from seventy-seven percent who wanted to abolish it in 1988.5
(That's right: more people wanted to abolish the electoral college in 1988, when George H.W. Bush thrashed Michael Dukakis, than after the 2000 election.) We also seem to love our
constitution. Seventy-one percent of Americans said in 1991 that
I. Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Yale University.
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
3. The first time was in 1876 in the Hayesffilden election. Florida was at the center of that contested election as well. Five justices of the Supreme Court along with five
Senators and five members of the House made up the Electoral Commission that resolved the disputed state election results in Florida, Oregon, South Carolina, and Louisiana. 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (Supplement) xv (1988).
4. See R. Michael Alvarez, et al., American Opinion on Election Reform, May 10,
2001, available at http://survey.caltech.edu/reform4.pdf at 3 (reporting that only 52% of
respondents supported replacing the electoral college with direct election of the president).
5. See http:J/www.ncpa.orgiopedlbartlett/nov2aXl.html (referencing 1988 ABOWashington
Post Poll).
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"they strongly agreed with the statement that they were proud of
the Constitution" (p. 122). How can this be so when our system
doesn't seem to be terribly democratic?
According to Robert Dahl, the failure of democracy in the
2000 election was not just a freak occurrence or a surprise outcome of an otherwise well-functioning-though idiosyncraticdemocratic system that happens every century or so, like earthquakes on the East Coast. Rather, the 2000 election was simply
the most egregious outcome of what Dahl contends are fundamental democratic failures in our constitutional scheme. These
defects make us the least democratic of the world's representative democracies, which provokes Dahl to ask why we have any
obligation at all to follow our constitution.
WHAT OBLIGATES US TO FOLLOW A CONSTITUTION
DRAFTED AND RATIFIED BY A BUNCH OF OLD,
DEAD, WHITE, MALE PROPERTY OWNERS?

Social contract theory has a hard time explaining Americans' present-day obligations, and Dahl finds social contract theory implausible as a general matter (p. 2). Even at the time of
the Constitution's adoption, Dahl rightly points out that social
contract theory runs into problems: voters were all-white and allmale, which calls into question the extent to which the Constitution (and the governmental action taken pursuant to it) could
then legitimately bind all Americans on any social contract theory.
Perhaps our common commitment to the principle of majority rule legitimizes our system. We seem to believe majority rule
is the legitimate method for political decisionmaking. No lesser a
light than James Madison said, "[T]he vital principle of republican flovernment is the lex majoris parties, the will of the majority" (p. 37). And if the furor in 1993 over Lani Guinier's proposal that we implement proportional voting schemes to
enhance minority representation was any indication, we are incredibly hostile to alternatives. From the outrage over her nomination to head the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department,7 one would have thought that she'd suggested means
testing for Social Security.
6. THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JAMES MADISON 409 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
7. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, More People View Clinton As Liberal As He Seeks
Center, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1993, § 1, at 1 (commenting on polls taken after the "uproar
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As it turns out, however, our system deviates from the principle of majority rule almost more than it follows it. Most of our
elections for national office require a candidate only to earn a
plurality, not a majority, of the votes cast to win election. (This
rule is sometimes called "first past the post.") In fact, in a third
of our presidential elections, the winner was elected by a plurality, rather than a majority, of voters (p. 80). It is hard to say
whether a plurality winner is actually the one whom a majority
of voters prefers. Had we held a run-off in the 1992 presidential
election (which Bill Clinton won by a plurality) it is difficult to
know whether a majority of first-round Perot voters would have
preferred Clinton to Bush.
The Electoral College dashes any remaining claim presidential elections have to being majoritarian. 8 States are assigned
electoral votes based on the number of Representatives and
Senators each state has. Less populous states have disproportionate electoral power because every state has at least one representative and two senators regardless of population. On a per
capita basis, a Wyoming voter (the least populous state) has almost four times the electoral clout as a Californian (p. 81), and
the "ten smallest states each choose two to three times as many
electors as they would if a state's electors were strictly in proportion to its population" (pp. 81-82). Combined with the fact that
48 states grant all of their electoral votes to the plurality winner,
it's hardly surprising that the candidate with the most popular
votes has lost in four elections. The only surprising thing is that it
hasn't happened more frequently. 9
Lucky for us, majority rule has little to do with democracy
or legitimacy, according to Dahl (p. 37). It is neither necessary
nor sufficient for democracy to exist. Democracy doesn't require
that the majority rule because majority voting schemes do not
necessarily reflect combined voters' preferences when there are
over his nomination of Lani Guinier to be the justice department's civil rights chief and
his withdrawal of the nomination," and noting that 47 percent of Americans polled "said
he did the right thing" while "65 percent of that group said Mr. Clinton was wrong to
nominate Ms. Guinier in the first place").
8. We have tried to democratize a system for electing the president that had been
purposefully designed by the framers to insulate the presidential election (and by extension, the president himself) from popular democratic forces. Ironically, by the 1804 election of Thomas Jefferson over John Adams, the electoral system was failing to deliver on
its original purpose of keeping popular politics out of the selection of the president. But
it should not surprise us that a system that was designed to be nondemocratic and insulated from popular politics will occasionally fail to reflect popular sentiment.
9. If the Plains states continue to depopulate, it may happen more frequently in
the future.
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more than two candidates. 10 Indeed, Arrow's Theorem suggests
that there are no voting schemes that can produce results that
accurately reflect individual preferences." So a rule that the majority wins may be more one of convenience or convention. Majority rule is not a sufficient condition for democracy because a
majority could rule autocratically by passing legislation that prevents minorities from voting. 12
Dahl proposes instead that the legitimacy of any constitutional scheme depends on its "utility as an instrument of democratic government" (p. 39). This criterion needs clarification: how
do we measure how well the Constitution serves us? According
to Dahl, the answer is the extent to which our government is
"democratic." 13 That hardly helps, because one still needs to
know what democracy is and have some way to measure whether
a government is more or less democratic. Dahl spends little time
(too little time) defining democracy in How Democratic Is the
American Constitution?, perhaps because he covered that topic
extensively in his book On Democracy, which, like this book, he
wrote for a general audience. 14 Because this is a crucial step in
his argument, it is worth examining his definition of this term
more closely. 15
10. A quick illustration. Let's say there are three people running for dog catcher,
Pluto, Mickey, and Goofy. If none of these candidates receives an absolute majority of
the vote, the election rules provide that there will be a run-off between the top two votegetters. For simplicity's sake, let's say that there are three groups of voters who have the
following preferences and comprise a certain segment of the population.
Voting group 1 (29% of the population) Pluto>Mickey>Goofy
Voting group 2 (31% of the population) Mickey>Pluto>Goofy
Voting group 3 (40% of the population) Goofy>Pluto>Mickey
At the election, no one wins an absolute majority, and Pluto, with only 29% of the
vote, is eliminated. In the run-off, Mickey faces Goofy and wins with 60% of the vote
because the voters who initially voted for Pluto switch to Mickey. If we add up the voters' preference intensities, however, Pluto should have won the election because most
voters preferred Pluto to Mickey. Because people behave strategically in response to the
anticipated behavior of others, however, designing a voting system that actually reflects
these preference intensities may well be impossible.
11. For elegant summaries of Arrow's Theorem, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-40 (1991) and
Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337.
12. See GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 19 (1962).
13. "I am going to suggest that we begin to view our American Constitution as
nothing more or less than a set of basic institutions and practices designed to the best of
our abilities for the purpose of attaining democratic values" (p. 3).
14. ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998).
15. One might object that Dahl's criticism of our constitution is misplaced because
we are a republic, not a popular democracy. Thus, to point out that our system falls short
on measures of democracy simply states the trivially obvious. Dahl replies that it is the
distinctions between a democracy and a republic that are trivial. In both kinds of systems,
the value of political equality plays a central role. Organizing ourselves into a representa-
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Defining democracy is no easy task. Giovanni Sartori has
argued persuasively that trying to define democracy as an abstract concept produces nothing much more illuminating than
statements like "democracy is the rule of the people." 16 Definitions of "democracy" and "democratic" may be best approached
sidewise-by considering why democracy is sought as an ideal. 17
According to Dahl, democracy is appealing because we accept as
a fundamental moral principle that "the good of every human
being" ought to be considered "as intrinsically equal to that of
any other." 18 By extension, governments "must" when making
decisions "give equal consideration to the good and interests of
every person bound by those decisions. " 19 Skepticism that specially qualified guardians could be entrusted with the power of
considering the good and interests of each person and implementing policies that fulfill the general good leads us to this prudential conclusion: Citizens of a state should treat each other for
political purposes as if each were equally qualified to participate- "directly or indirectly through their elected representatives" -in "making the policies, rules, laws, or other decisions
that citizens are expected (or required) to obey" (p. 136). A belief in the moral equality of each human therefore leads to the
adoPction of the principle that Dahl refers to as "political equality" 0 (p. 135). A political system in which the people govern
themselves according the principle of political equality is therefore a democratic one.
Putting political equalitf into practice requires commitment
to several other principles. 2 First, democracy requires equality
in voting, with each citizen's preference taken equally into account. Second, democracy must enable citizens to participate effectively in government. That is, each citizen should have adequate, equal opportunities for expressing her preferences. Third,

tive republic is a way of achieving democracy's upsides on a large scale, while buffering
ourselves against some of democracy's downsides.
I6. See SARTORI, supra note 12, at 17.
I 7. Cf id. at viii (stating that his "concern [is] with the ideas and/or ideals that produce and preserve a democratic system"); id. at 225 (arguing that a "word like democracy
acquires a definite, helpful, and usable meaning only if we remember that it is an abbreviation summarizing the acquisitions and values of a civilization").
I 8. DAHL, supra note 14, at 65.
I9. !d.
20. Moral skeptics need not be put off by Dahl's line of argument, for skepticism
yields the same conclusion: because what is right and good cannot be proved or disproved with certainty, each citizen's opinions on matters should be considered to have
equal weight, for any other rule requires us to reject skepticism
21. DAHL, supra note 14, at 84-86.
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citizens should be able to act on enlightened understanding,
which means that they ought to have sufficient time and opportunity to form considered judgments about policy preferences.
Fourth, citizens should have final control of the political agenda.
Citizens may delegate authority to others who make decisions in
nondemocratic ways (such as regulatory agencies). But citizens
must retain control over those decisionmakers' agenda. Finally, a
democracy must allow all permanent residents to become citizens and participate fully in the democracy. 22 The first condition
is how political equality manifests itself in operation, and it is a
prerequisite for all of the other conditions to exist.
Dahl's criticism of the American constitution centers on the
Constitution's failure to ensure political equality and indeed on
its enshrinement of institutions designed to ensure voter inequality. These antidemocratic institutions, Dahl argues, were
adopted for reasons that have no relevance for us today, and
thus have no claim to legitimacy.
How has our constitution enshrined the principle of voter
inequality? Well, as already noted, in presidential elections, citizens in small states have a greater say on a per-capita-basis in
who becomes president than citizens of larger states (Appendix
B, Figure 2, "Unequal Representation in the Electoral College"). Most dramatically, however, the Senate gives each state
an equal voice in Congress regardless of its population. This too
distorts democracy by giving states with small populations power
completely disproportionate to their numbers- Wyoming's
493,782 people have two Senators, the same as California's
thirty-four million people (p. 50). 23 The Senate's composition is
insulated from the democratic process as well. The Constitution
guarantees that no state will be stripped of its equal representation in the Senate without its consent, which no state will ever
g1ve.
Our constitution creates a government with other undemocratic features as well. The Constitution created the Supreme
Court as an unelected body with life tenure, but it did not clearly
define what the judiciary's powers would be. Justice John Mar22. /d.
23. Because each state has at least one representative in the House, there is a
smaller bias in favor of residents of small states in that house of congress as well. A citi·
zen in Wyoming has 132% of the voting power of a California citizen in the House of
Representatives. (One member of the House for Wyoming's 494,000 citizens compared
to one representative for every 651,377 California citizens) (derived by author from 2000
Census data).)
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shall helpfully stepped in to fill that breach. Finally, the Constitution granted Congress only limited powers. This too checks
democracy by artificially limiting the scope of the people's
power as expressed through their congressional representatives?4 The Constitution used to be even less democratic, of
course, and most constitutional amendments in the last 150 years
have sought to cure the most obvious defects-securing universal suffrage regardless of race, sex, or wealth, 25 and ensuring the
direct election of Senators.
AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ARE WE AT LEAST
UNDEMOCRATIC IN A USEFUL WAY?

In short, our federal government isn't terribly democratic at
all. Indeed, Dahl argues that the American system is the least
democratic when compared to the other longstanding democracies in the world. 26 Implicitly conceding that no governmental
scheme can be perfectly democratic, Dahl argues our government might still claim legitimacy if it provides a useful governmental framework. He proposes five criteria for judging a system's utility. First, a constitution must help maintain a stable
government. Citizens cannot govern themselves if the country
constantly threatens to fly apart or if the military poses a credi24. Things used to be much worse, and Dahl catalogs the nondemocratic elements
of the Constitution as it was originally adopted. Originally, the Constitution allowed
slavery, did not empower Congress to forbid it, made the fugitive slave laws part of the
constitution itself, and gave slave states an electoral advantage in the House and in the
Electoral College by adding 3/5 of every slave to a state's population (pp. 15-20). The
Framers did not even debate this final point. Clinton Rossiter argues that representation
in the Congress of 1783 had apportioned representatives according to the 3/5 rule, and
consequently, "most northern delegates must have realized ... that [the 3/5 rule] would
be the minimum price of Southern acceptance." CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND
CONVENTION 173 (1966).
25. It took five constitutional amendments to provide the constitutional basis for
universal suffrage: the Thirteenth Amendment (1865) banned slavery, the Fifteenth
Amendment (1870) declared that the right to vote could not be denied because of race;
the Nineteenth Amendment (1920!) guaranteed women the right to vote, the TwentyFourth Amendment (1964) banned poll taxes, and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (1971)
extended the right to vote to persons eighteen and over. But as we all know, the constitution was not enough to guarantee African Americans' right to vote; "nearly two centuries" elapsed "before a president and Congress could overcome the effective veto of a
minority of states in order to pass" the Voting Rights Act in 1965 "to guarantee the voting rights of African Americans" (p. 16).
26. Dahl compares us to twenty-two other countries that have continuously had a
democratic government since at least 1950 (Appendix B Table 1). They are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland,
Ireland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Dahl does not include India
because Indira Gandhi's 1975 coup interrupted its democratic rule.
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ble danger to civil government. Second, a constitution must protect fundamental democratic rights, by which Dahl means basic
civil liberties like freedom of speech and of the press (p. 97).
Citizens must have these liberties to understand and weigh in on
political issues (Dahl's "enlightened understanding") and to
have some influence over the political agenda. Third, it must ensure democratic fairness among citizens-that is, it should count
each citizen's concerns as equal. 27 Fourth, it must help form democratic consensus. Fifth, it must create a government embodying these characteristics that can also solve problems effectively.
Unfortunately, Dahl isn't able to draw many conclusions
about how our constitution, or any other constitution for that
matter, makes government more or less useful. The world's oldest twenty-two democracies have been stable enough that Dahl
cannot say whether a particular constitutional scheme makes
democratic governments more or less stable. Instead, stable governments look to be possible within a broad range of constitutional arrangements (pp. 93-94). Nor is he comfortable with saying that particular kinds of constitutions protect democratic
rights like freedom of the speech and press better than others.
Instead, Dahl attributes different levels of protection of rights
and liberties to "national histories, political cultures, and perceptions of internal and strategic threats to survival" (p. 99). He
thinks that the protection of civil liberties depends wholly "on
the beliefs and culture shared by its political, legal, and cultural
elites and by the citizens to whom these elites are responsive" (p.
99).
It is also hard to say whether particular constitutional structures make governments more or less able to solve problems,
mostly because it's hard to measure how good or bad a government is at problem solving (pp. 116-18). The only evidence that
Dahl points to is that divided government-when the legislative
majority is of a different party than the executive-stacks the
deck against drafting and passing important legislation (p. 111).
Over the last century, we have usually had divided government,
but most of the major waves of legislative change-the New
Deal, the Great Society programs, and the civil rights laws of the
1960s-have generally all occurred during periods of united government. (The one exception, the Reagan tax cuts of 1981, was
27. DAHL, supra note 14, at 65. This principle of political equality is a supplement
to the more general moral principle that "[w]e ought to regard the good of every human
being as intrinsically equal to that of any other." !d.
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passed when Republicans controlled the Senate and the Presidency but the Democrats still held the House.) But the fact that
divided government makes sweeping legislative change very difficult doesn't really address Dahl's criterion. We would still need
to know whether our constitutional structure makes it more
likely that we will have divided government, whether during periods of divided government a majority wants some problem
fixed that the federal government does not address, and whether
the legislation passed during periods of unified government actually alleviate the problems they are designed to fix. Unfortunately, Dahl doesn't ask these questions, much less answer them.
And if sweeping change contradicted democratic requirements,
such as with anti-sedition laws in World War I, or the USA Patriot Act, one would hardly say the ability to pass legislation
made the government more democratic.
Dahl can draw conclusions with regard to two of his criteria.
First, he argues persuasively (and for the intuitive position) that
our first-past-the-post system for determining the winner of congressional and presidential elections does not promote consensus
as well as proportional representation systems (pp. 104-05). In
proportional representaticn systems, governments formed by
parties that do not have an absolute majority in the legislature
have to work with other parties to get legislation through (p.
107). Interestingly, too, Dahl presents evidence that voters on
the losing side in proportional representation systems (those
who voted for nongoveming parties) reported greater satisfaction with how their democracy worked than voters in majoritarian or first-past-the-post systems who came out on the losing
end (pp. 107-09).
This argument may be one of the most interesting and useful parts of the book. As our country becomes less homogeneous
and more diverse, we may want to consider proportional representation more seriously. Dahl shows that we can- consistent
with democratic principles-consider proportional representation alternatives to majority (or, if we're being accurate, plurality) rule. The major substantive argument against proportional
representation-that it tends to cement minority group preferences and thus impede the development of consensus-does not
seem to hold much water in light of his evidence about high levels of consensus in proportional representation systems.
Dahl's central conclusion and criticism, however, is that our
constitution flouts the principle of political equality or democratic fairness (pp. 99-100). Had our institutions of political ine-
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quality, such as the Senate, ever served a use (and Dahl is skeptical about that), Dahl is adamant that they have none now. Out
of the twenty-two democracies he surveys, we have the one with
the most unequal representation, largely due to the principle of
equal representation of the states in the Senate and Electoral
College. Even among democracies with federal systems, we still
stand out on this score (p. 49).
Dahl is quite right that there's no principled reason that our
constitution sacrifices individual political equality for equal state
representation. The Senate is a creature of political necessity,
not of principle. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention
knew exactly what they were sacrificing, and it horrified many of
them. Dahl quotes Alexander Hamilton who inveighed against
giving states equal representation:
As states are a collection of individual men which ought we to
respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or the
artificial beings resulting from the composition. Nothing could
be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former
to the latter. It has been sd. that if the smaller States renounce
their equality, they renounce at the same time their liberty.
The truth is it is a contest for power, not for liberty. Will the
men composing the small States be less free than those composing the larger (p. 13-14)?8

Given the serious, substantive objections to equal state representation, why did the delegates permanently enshrine it in our constitution?
Because they had to. The small states29 absolutely refused to
consider a constitutional system that did not give them equal
representation in the legislature. 30 States and their citizens, it
seems, became accustomed to voting on matters concerning the
28. Citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 466 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966).
29. The most ardent proponents of equal state representation were New Jersey,
Delaware, Connecticut, and New York. Yes, New York was a smallish state in the 1780s,
less than half the size of Virginia, and smaller than North Carc>lina. Its leaders (with the
significant exception of Alexander Hamilton) also worried about conceding power to the
federal government and thought that equal state representation would help limit the federal government's powers. See ROSSITER, supra note 24, at 93.
30. The opposition to creating a legislature that was elected on a purely per capita
basis actually ran much more broadly than these four states. Rhode Island refused to
send a delegation to the Constitutional Convention, and New Hampshire's delegates
missed the critical votes on the design of the federal legislature. Rossiter asserts quite
reasonably that these states would have been loath to ratify a constitution without some
provision for equal state representation in the federal legislature. ROSSITER, supra note
24, at 189.
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states collectively as states. Small states, moreover, feared that
without a guarantee of equal representation, Virginia's representatives would have a free hand to run the federal government.
(On this score, the Senate didn't precisely save them from Virginia's power, as four of the first five presidents were Virginians.) It's possible too that Virginia's alacrity in introducing the
first proposal for the Constitution heightened the small states'
anxiety. (Virginia had proposed a bicameral national legislature
in which representation in both houses would be per capita and
representation would be based on both the free and slave population.)31
Even without Virginia's piggy proposal, the small states
would never have agreed to a legislature elected on a purely per
capita basis, because they did not have to. The small states held
the entire convention in a classic hold-out situation. Members of
the Constitutional Convention wanted a constitution that citizens
in every state would ratify, and they needed a constitution that at
least three-quarters of the states would. The Senate's composition and the constitutional guarantee that no state could be deprived of its equal vote in the Senate were the "rent" the small
states exacted.
In Dahl's eyes, for political inequality to be a legitimate part
of a democratic system it must protect some bona fide interest
from attack by a democratic majority. I take this principle to apply more generally to any deviations from his five criteria of democracy within any system claiming to be democratic. An example of a justifiable deviation is Germany's ban of the Nazi party.
This ban certainly limits Germans' associational and free speech
rights, but it made perfect pragmatic sense for that country as it
tried to forge a democracy in the shadow of the Third Reich.
With regard to our violations of the principle of political
equality, Dahl thinks small states have no valid claim to special
protection. In the first place, they never had any real "need to be
protected from federal laws passed by congressional majorities
that would violate their rights and interests" (p. 50). 32 He is
surely right that residents of small states have little in common
other than their lack of population, and it is true that the two
smallest states, Delaware and Rhode Island, had few (if any)
common substantive interests.
3!. !d. at 169-70.
32. "Why ... geographical location [should] endow a citizen or group of citizens
with special rights and interests'' leaves Dahl "baffled" (p. 52).
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If states did have common interests/ 3 a principled justifica-

tion for equal state representation would still have to explain
why the people of these states deserve to speak in a disproportionately loud voice in the national legislature. The only possible
justification for the Senate's composition I can think of-to §ive
state governments representation in the national legislature 4 disappeared when the Seventeenth Amendment secured direct
election of Senators. This "democratization" of the Senate has
ironically decreased its "utility as an instrument of democratic
government," to use Dahl's terminology. Now the Senate is just
a more exclusive and less democratic version of the House.
As a native of California, I have great sympathy for Dahl's
arguments for political equality. I can't fault his reasoning or his
conclusion that equal representation of states at the expense of
individual representation has no principled basis. Nevertheless,
Dahl's argument misses a fundamental point. The United States
simply would never have existed but for this constitutional compromise. The United States was created out of former colonies
that had been governed independently of one another; representatives of these independent state governments drafted the Constitution. The Constitutional Convention asked all states to give
up some of their independence to the federal government. The
small states felt as though they had compromised as much as
they could- and perhaps more than their constituents would
consent to-by agreeing to per capita representation in the
House and to the supremacy of the federal government. Clinton
Rossiter explains:
The Great Compromise [of equal representation of states in
the Senate] was a confirmation of the states as states, as
communities that had never been and never would be
sovereign nations, and yet always had been and still meant to
be discrete, self-conscious, indestructible units of political and
social organization. It was also a confirmation of the Union as
a union, as a nation that was more than a tight confederacy of
sovereignties that shared a common destiny, and yet less than
a consolidation of malleable components .... Dr. Johnson of
Connecticut, went to the root of the matter with the help of
George Mason by reminding Paterson that America was, for
many purposes, "one political society" composed of individu33. In fact, today the smallest states-Alaska, Montana, North and South Dakota,
and Wyoming-have a lot of common interests. All are predominately rural, frontier states,
and four of them neighbor each other and have cattle-ranching as a major industry.
34. For example, to prevent the federal government from saddling the states with
unfunded mandates.
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als, and by reminding Madison that the states, too, were po35
litical societies with "interests" all their own.

Dahl spends little time discussing the history behind the
Constitution's compromises, which is understandable-his project, after all, is assessing the Constitution's current legitimacy as
a governing document. Ultimately, however, this narrow focus
compromises this book's analysis. His emphasis on current justifications at the expense of historical justifications causes him to
overlook what is probably the reason why we hold our constitution, with all of its flaws, in such high esteem and why there is little pressure to change its fundamentals.
This nation almost did not happen because of the dispute
over power between the large and the small states. 36 The small
states considered the Senate's composition to be a deal breaker.
Had we not compromised this aspect of individual equality for
equal state representation, we would never have become the
world's first modern democracy. 37 We also could not have remained a loose confederation of states. The delegates to the
convention all agreed that the Articles of Confederation were
completely unworkable and had to go. Had the convention
failed, what is now the United States likely would have become
independent state governments, or three nations or confederacies, perhaps with the New England states, the mid-Atlantic
states, and the Southern states each banding together. One hesitates to roam in the realm of counterfactuals, but one thing
35. ROSSITER, supra note 24, at 193.
36. Clinton Rossiter relates an incident late in the Constitutional Convention. Edmond Randolph, a Virginia delegate, was exasperated that the convention was about to
compromise the principle of equal representation of individuals in favor of equal representation of states in the Senate (and not coincidentally, also dilute the power of residents of large states in the legislature) by the narrowest of margins: five votes for the
compromise, four against, and one abstention. He moved that the convention adjourn so
that the "large states might consider the steps proper to be taken in the present solemn
crisis of the business, and that the small states might also deliberate on the means of conciliation." William Paterson of New Jersey, one of the strongest supporters of equal state
representation, agreed, perhaps with too much alacrity and vehemence. He concurred
"that it was high time for the Convention to adjourn," the rule requiring the delegates to
keep the discussion secret should "be rescinded, and our constituents should be consulted." The small states, he said, would not join in union with the others unless the constitution guaranteed equality of the states. "If Mr. Randolph would reduce to form his
motion for an adjournment sine die [a complete adjournment of the convention], (Mr.
Paterson] would second it with all his heart." !d. at 194. The next day, the large states
largely conceded this issue.ld. at 196.
37. This statement certainly proves too much. The continued existence of slavery
was also a precondition to union, but that fact was not a reason to retain those provisions
in the constitution. The Civil War did not exact too high a price to banish slavery from
our Constitution and country.
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seems safe to hazard. United, and with an assist from John Marshall, the states created the world's first "free trade zone," which
Europe has envied, emulated, and still struggles to achieve. The
fact that our farming regions could sell their crops without duties
to industrial regions (and vice versa) and labor could move
freely to wherever demand for workers was greatest meant that
we became one of the most prosperous nations on earth. Because trade among citizens of different states (both in labor and
goods) was so easy and cheap, we could take advantage of Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage, with different areas
of the country specializing in the commercial activity each was
best at. 38
Were we to begin anew, I am skeptical that we would have
the political will to fashion a different constitution that is significantly more democratic or egalitarian. States continue to be an
important organizing feature in our country, and it is hard to
imagine that two hundred years into our history as a country that
people would favor a radical reorganization of the basic federal
structure of our government. Dahl also fails to convince me that
the costs involved in fashioning a completely new (and surely
imperfect in new and unexpected ways) constitution to cure existing defects would be worth the candle. So long as we are
committed to remaining one united country, any new constitution would run into the same kinds of coordination problems
that the framers faced with the first-though of course with different state players. One can imagine, for example, that California, Texas, New York, and Florida would insist on constitutional
provisions that favored them as large states. As the sixth largest
economy in the world and the largest agricultural producer in
the United States, California could demand on provisions that
favored it backed up with a credible threat of independence.
Dahl could have spent more time considering the less obvious ways that our constitution might actually enhance democracy. One obvious possibility is that by implicitly reserving broad
powers to the states, the federal constitution leaves room for
more participatory democracy on a broad range of subjects at
the state level. Where Congress does not legislate or cannot legislate, the states have plenary authority to do so. All state governments have legislatures that are elected entirely on a per cap-

38. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION (Dutton 1%5 (1911)).
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ita basis,39 and the Constitution ensures that they will be "republican" governments. As citizens' ability to influence policies is
inversely related to the size of the government, citizens necessarily have more access, power, and influence at the state level than
at the national level. States may thus compensate for some of the
democratic flaws of the federal government's design.
Dahl's inattention to states means that he overlooks that
states may function as "polyarchic" institutions in our federal
system. In other works, Dahl has stressed that "polyarchic" institutions are an essential feature of a large-sc~le functioning democracy. These institutions are organizations formed by individuals around particular political or social interests. Political
parties are the most obvious examples of polyarchic institutions,
but so are interest groups like the Sierra Club and labor unions
and community organizations like churches. These institutions
are important because they act as mediators between government institutions and individuals, giving members information
about policies and communicating members' wants to government institutions. In a large-scale democracy, like ours, these
polyarchic institutions are essential because individuals quite
simply lack the time, resources, and interest necessary to be experts on all political matters (and it would be exceedingly inefficient for each individual to do so). Polyarchic institutions also
channel and concentrate the power of their individual members,
which enable these groups and their members to gain some leverage in and access to the political process over issues important
to them. 40
While Americans today probably do not feel as intensely
loyal to their home states as the Framers did, identification with
one's home state is an important part of most Americans' identity. States, too, have distinct cultures and economic structures,
and those differences affect both the kinds of policies that individuals support and the kinds of policies that actually work at
the state level. While the principle of equal representation of
states may be non-democratic in one sense, it has likely supported the evolution of states into institutions that can act as intermediaries between individuals and the federal government.

39. Thanks to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964).
40. Ronald A. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation, and Opposition in DEMOCRACY: A
READER 124 (Ricardo Blaug & John Schwarzmantel eds., 2001).
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WHERE CAN WE Go FROM HERE?

Eighth grade civics class taught us all that amending the
Constitution is extraordinarily difficult. Amending the Constitution to cure the political inequality defects that Dahl identifies is
practically impossible. Constitutional amendments to repeal the
Electoral College predictably die in the Senate shy of the twothirds supermajority (p. 87-88), which makes the likelihood that
three-quarters of the states would ratify such an amendment
zero. The Senate's composition is not going to change, either.
Dahl expresses pessimism that nonconstitutional changes to
the Electoral College would be any more popular. His main suggestion is that states could adopt either the Nebraska or the
Maine model (p. 86-87). In those states, electors are appointed
by district, with each district having one electoral vote. The two
remaining electoral votes go to the highest (plurality) vote getter
in the state. Dahl points out that early in our history, many states
selected electors in this manner. It has only been in this century
that most states have instituted the first-past-the-post winnertakes-all rule.
The Nebraska/Maine Model presents several advantages
over the winner-takes-all rule that could make it attractive to a
number of states. First, states that changed to a per district electoral system would be less likely to be considered "safe" statesstates that one presidential candidate is nearly certain to win.
Our three largest states are "safe" states. California and New
York have voted for Democrats for president by large majorities
in 1992, 1996, and 2000. Texas has been a "safe" state for
Republicans for a couple of decades now. The existence of
"safe" states means that Republican presidential candidates
haven't really bothered to campaign in California or New
York-they visited these states rarely and did not run many advertisements. And Democrats haven't really bothered with
Texarhat our three largest states are "safe" means that presidential candidates didn't have to play to more than a third of our
population during the campaign. In a game for the most electoral votes, candidates predictably spend their resources where
they have a real chance losing or winning by a small majority (or
plurality). More than presidential-candidate face-time is at stake.
Candidates make campaign promises to their allies in key, contested states in return for their vocal and active support during
the election and in getting out the vote. Florida has gotten many
goodies and policy concessions over the past three years from
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the Bush administration. 41 We persist in irrational policies such
as the trade embargo with Cuba because Cuban refugees are an
important bloc in an important state; if they had instead immigrated to Arkansas, we would have been smoking Havana cigars
and vacationing in Cuba years ago. 42 Some of the smallest states
(which theoretically benefit from the electoral college system)
are the safest. The five states with only three electors each (the
minimum possible number), Alaska, Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Wyoming, have all been "safe" Republican
states since at least the 1970s. Hawaii, with four electoral votes,
has traditionally been a safe state for Democrats.
Candidates predictably expend few resources on these
states during the elections (unless there was a contested senate
seat, as there was in 2000 in South Dakota for Tom Daschle's
seat). Changing to the Nebraska/Maine process does not ameliorate the Electoral College's basic political inequality, for small
states still have a disproportionately large vote in the College itself. But any change from winner-take-all systems enhances democracy-winner-take-all systems discourage third-parties from
forming, and in safe states winner-take-all reduces voters' incentives to vote.
Dahl overlooks another change that we could make that
would make our elections for nationwide office more democratic. Perhaps the least "democratic" method for determining
winners is the first-past-the-post rule, according to which the
candidate with the plurality of the vote wins an office or the
state's electoral votes. All states award their electoral votes to
the plurality winner, and most states use the same rule to determine winners for seats in Congress. There is an important practical reason for having a first-past-the-post rule. Runoffs are impossible in presidential elections as the Constitution provides

41. Blaine Harden, National and State Politics Help Protect a Swamp, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2002, at Al (stating that the Bush administration backed the National Park Service plan to restrict access to off-road vehicles in the Everglades to sway "green" voters
to vote for President Bush in 2004); Elisabeth Burniller & Carl Hulse, U.S. May Buy
Back Florida Oil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,2002, at Al (reporting that the federal government would buy oil and gas rights to the Everglades and to Florida panhandle
beaches in order to protect three wildlife preserves in Florida as part of the Bush administration's bid to help Jeb Bush win reelection as Florida's governor).
42. See, e.g., Christopher Marquis & Eric Schmitt, Bush Faces Pressure from Congress to Alter Cuba Policy, N.Y. TiMES, May 20, 2002, at A4 (reporting that President
Bush intended to toughen restrictions on trade and travel to Cuba as part of a strategy to
court Cuban voters seen as crucial to his election in 2000, despite calls from some leaders
in Congress to ease restrictions).
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that elections will take place on one day. And for other nationwide races, run-offs are expensive and cumbersome.
Technology, however, makes automatic or instant run-off
voting (IRV) systems possible. Australia has -;uccessfully implemented such a system to elect its Lower House, and the Republic of Ireland uses IRVin its presidential elections. Under such a
system, voters rank candidates in order of preference, and in the
first vote, each voter's first preference is tallied. If no candidate
wins an absolute majority according to the first ranking, then all
candidates save the top two vote-getters are dropped, and those
candidates' votes go to their supporters' second preference. This
is a change that does not favor or disadvantage small or large
states; it also does not advantage or disadvantage early or late
adopters. This fact makes it a possible, practical method for
making our elections more democratic, and possibly more exciting (which could help voter turnout.)
COULD A, SHOULD A, WOULDA?

This book risks being a desultory coulda-shoulda-woulda
nag. One unlikely event saves it. The war in Iraq. Ultimately,
Dahl's message seems to this reader to be that constitutions are
culturally, geographically, and historically contingent documents,
and democracies come in at least thirty-one flavors. Any country
that holds its own constitution out as a model for other countries
does no one any favors. As we help to build a new Iraq and advise Iraqis as they write a new constitution, we should keep this
message in mind. It could be a mistake, for example, to insist on
a presidential democracy for Iraq as opposed to a parliamentary
system. Iraq's history presents ample reasons to be suspicious of
investing authority in one individual over executive functions
like law enforcement and the military. At the least, Iraqis might
have a particular resistance to viewing such political arrangements as trustworthy and legitimate. On the other hand, evidence that Ira~'s judiciary had something of an ethos of ~ud~c~al
independence4 could mean that our unusual system of JUdicial
review might work well. Additionally, Iraq's ethnic and religious
divisions make Dahl's discussion about when constitutions may
legitimately sacrifice democratic ideals like political equality
quite topical. Dahl points out that a political system can protect
43. See Richard Coughlin, In Iraq A Judicial System Worth Saving, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26,2003, at Al3. But see Bernard Weinraub, Aftereffects: Law: U.S. Seeks Solid Core
to Fix Iraq's Broken Legal System, N.Y. nMES, Apr. 27,2003, § 1, at 24.
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a minority's interests without employing our approach of giving
a minority (in our case, small states) an equal voice on all issues.
A constitution can protect minority interests on particular subjects (like free exercise of religion or free association) by completely insulating those interests from majority rule (our Bill of
Rights' approach). A constitution that provides for proportional
representation might also protect a minority's interests by requiring a supermajority in order to pass laws in particular subject
areas to ensure that minorities consent to regulation in that area.
This latter approach has the advantage of flexibility, as the contours of a minority's particular interests and concerns may
change over time. Proportional representation could also, as
Dahl discusses, have the corollary advantage of promoting functional working relationships among ethnic and religious groups.
In the final analysis, we can be proud of our constitution,
but Dahl gives us a number of cogent reasons to feel humble
about it. At the very least, as a country that likes to think of itself
as a beacon of democracy to the rest of the world (and hopefully
as a transmitter of democracy to Iraq), we ought to resist the
temptation to generalize the universal from our particulars.

